AVIATION/ AIR FRANCE FL447 STALLED AND FELL WITHIN 3.5 MINUTES

 THE FLIGHT TRAJECTORY OF THE LAST 6 MINUTES OF THE

FLIGHT IS SEEN IN THIS GRAPHIC PROVIDED BY THE BEA TODAY.

The French BEA has released its Interim Narration of newly discovered facts following the read out of the black boxes from AIR FRANCE Flight 447, the Airbus A330 that crashed into the Atlantic on June 1, 2009, killing all 228 onboard. The Narration states that the Captain left his seat about 15 minutes prior to the last position report, handing control of the aircraft to the First Officer and the Second Officer, who were occupying the left and right hand seats and were flying at the time of the accident. The Captain attended the briefing of the 2 officers about 9 to 11 minutes prior to the last position report (at 02:10Z). The Pilot flying stated: "the little bit of turbulence that you just saw (…) we should find the same ahead (…) we’re in the cloud layer unfortunately we can’t climb much for the moment because the temperature is falling more slowly than forecast" continuing "the logon with Dakar failed". After the briefing, the Captain left the cockpit. The Airbus was flying at 35000 feet at Mach 0.82 at that time, weight was about 205 tons and the center of gravity was at 29%, well within limits. At 02:06Z, the Pilot flying called the cabin informing cabin crew: "in 2 minutes we should enter an area where it’ll move about a bit more than at the moment, you should watch out". At 02:08Z, the Pilot not flying suggested "you can maybe go a little to the left (…)", the aircraft then entered a slight left turn, turning off the course by about 12 degrees. Levels of turbulence increased and the crew slowed to 0.8 mach in response. At 02:10:05Z, the autopilot followed by autothrust disengaged (and remained disengaged until impact). The Pilot flying said "I have controls", the airplane began to turn right and the Pilot made a left nose up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp decrease of airspeed from about 275 knots to 60 knots indicated airspeed displayed in the left hand primary display followed by a similiar indication in the stand by instruments (the right hand speed indications are not recorded by the FDR). At 02:10:16Z, the Pilot monitoring said "so, we’ve lost the speeds" followed by "alternate law (…)". The aircraft's angle of attack progressively increased above 10 degrees nose up and the Airbus started to climb reaching up to 7000 feet per minute of climb rate. The Pilot flying made nose down inputs followed by left and right roll commands, the climb rate reduced to 700 feet per minute, the bank angles varied between 10 degrees left and 12 degrees right. The speed indication on the left primary instrument sharply increased to 215 KIAS (Mach 0.68), the Airbus reached 37500 feet and the angle of attack reduced to 4 degrees. At 02:10:50Z, the Pilot monitoring repeatedly attempted to call the Captain back into the cockpit. At 02:10:51Z, the stall warning sounded again. The thrust levers were placed into the TO/GA detent, and the Pilot flying made nose up commands on his side stick. The angle of attack increased again through 6 degrees nose up and continued to increase, the trim went from 3 degrees to 13 degrees nose up in about 1 minute and remained there until impact. About 15 seconds after the 2nd stall warning the airspeed indicated on the standby instruments sharply increased to 185 KIAS and became consistent with the left hand speed. The Pilot flying continued to make nose up inputs, the aircraft reached 38000 feet, pitch and angle of attack reached 16 degrees nose up. At 02:11:40Z, the Captain entered the cockpit. At that time the indicated airspeeds became invalid (airspeeds are removed being considered invalid below 30 knots, AoA values are considered invalid below 60 KIAS) and the stall warning stopped. The Airbus at that point was at 35000 feet, pitch did not exceed 15 degrees nose up, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees nose up and the descent rate had reached 10,000 feet per minute. The airplane encountered roll oscillations of up to 40 degrees of bank angles, the Pilot flying made a control input to the left and ceased nose up pressure. Both Co-Pilots stated they had no indications. At 02:12:02, the thrust levers were placed into idle, the Pilot flying made nose down inputs, the angle of attack reduced and the indicated airspeeds became valid again. At 02:13:32, the Pilot flying remarked "we are going to arrive at flight level 100". About 15 seconds later inputs were recorded from both side sticks, the Captain said "go ahead you have the controls". The angle of attack remained above 35 degrees nose up. The recordings stopped at 02:14:28, the last recorded values were: "10,912 feet/min descent rate, ground speed of 107 knots, pitch angle 16.2 degrees nose up, bank angle 5.3 degrees left and a magnetic heading of 270 degrees".

The BEA summarized the new findings:
1. The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures.
2. At the time of the event, the weight and balance of the airplane were within the operational limits.
3. At the time of the event, the 2 Co-Pilots were seated in the cockpit and the Captain was resting. The latter returned to the cockpit about 1 min 30 seconds after the disengagement of the autopilot.
4. There was an inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS). This lasted for less than one minute.
5. After the autopilot disengagement:
* the airplane climbed to 38000 feet,
* the stall warning was triggered and the airplane stalled,
* the inputs made by the Pilot Flying were mainly nose-up,
* the descent lasted 3 minutes 30 seconds, during which the airplane remained stalled. The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees,
* the engines were operating and always responded to crew commands.
6. The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, a roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.

A full report into the disaster is not expected until next year. Airbus, the maker of the A330 jet involved, said the French statement was a "significant step" in understanding the causes of the crash. Ahead of today's statement, the BEA said it wished to correct "partial and more or less contradictory information published in the media". It said it was giving "factual elements on the operation of the flight that establish the circumstances of the accident but not the causes".